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This article analyses the experience of five conditional cash
transfer programmes established in Latin America to reduce poverty and
increase human capital in the form of education, health and nutrition.
These innovative programmes should help towards the Millennium
Development Goals, and some have become pillars of their countries’
anti-poverty efforts. The article begins by presenting some of the
concepts that underlie conditional transfer programmes. It then goes on
to examine the following experiences: the Bolsa Escola programme and
the Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour (Brazil), Families in
Action (Colombia), the Social Protection Network (Nicaragua) and the
Oportunidades programme (Mexico), analysing their goals, components,
targeting mechanisms, impact and efficiency. The article concludes by
offering some policy recommendations and identifying design
components that might serve as good practice when programmes of this
kind are implemented.
Pablo Villatoro
Consultant with the Social
Development Division of ECLAC
✒  pablo.villatoro@cepal.org
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 6  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 5




The development targets set for 2015 at the Millennium
Summit included a halving of poverty and hunger,
universal primary education, equitable access to all
levels of education and a reduction in maternal and
child mortality. For these targets to be met, the public
sector needs to commit itself to the implementation of
multisectoral strategies that can contribute
simultaneously to the attainment of these aims (United
Nations, 2001).
This article analyses the experience of five
conditional cash transfer programmes established in
Latin America to reduce poverty and increase human
capital in the form of education, health and nutrition,
with the potential to make a major contribution to the
attainment of the United Nations development targets.
These programmes were chosen because they were
well documented and not necessarily because they
represented best practice for programmes of this type.
Following this introductory section, section II
presents the concepts underlying the implementation
of conditional transfer programmes. Section III
analyses the experience of the Bolsa Escola programme
(which provides school grants) and the Programme for
the Eradication of Child Labour, both in Brazil; the
Families in Action programme in Colombia; the Social
Protection Network in Nicaragua, and the
Oportunidades programme in Mexico, with reference
to their goals, components, targeting mechanisms,
impacts and cost-effectiveness. Lastly, section IV
offers some policy recommendations and identifies
design components that could be helpful when
programmes of this type come to be implemented.
II
Preliminary concepts
Programmes that make cash transfers conditional on
investment in human capital need to be judged in the
context of a new approach to social protection. The
social consequences of economic crises and structural
adjustment programmes led to a debate about the
rationality of existing safety nets (Ravallion, 2003).
The result of this debate is that instead of concentrating
so much on short-term poverty reduction, social
protection systems have shifted towards a risk
management approach aimed at enhancing human
capital and defeating poverty in the longer term.
According to the social risk management
approach (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 2000),
individuals, households and communities are exposed
to multiple risks. Poverty means greater vulnerability,
since the poor have little access to suitable risk
management instruments and are ill placed to cope with
crises. The mechanisms most used by poor families to
deal with economic shocks are informal strategies (e.g.,
taking their children out of school) whose inefficiency
may result in an irreversible loss of human capital and
perpetuation of the intergenerational cycle of poverty.
The risk management model assigns three
functions to public policy: prevention, mitigation and
coping. The social protection system uses mitigation
strategies to reduce the impact of future risk, and
coping strategies to cushion the impact of risk once it
has arisen (World Bank, 2001c; Hicks and Wodon,
2001). Looked at this way, social protection measures
are human capital investments that enhance access to
basic services and prevent the use of strategies with
adverse long-term consequences, benefiting: i) people
living in structural poverty, ii) those just above the
poverty line, and iii) groups with special needs.
Conditional transfer programmes stem from the
concept of social protection as human capital
investment. Their premise is that the reproduction of
poverty across generations is due to a lack of
investment in human capital, and they seek to
incentivize this investment by attaching conditions to
transfers (ECLAC, 2000). Conditional transfers might be
more effective than traditional methods because the
conditionality should reduce the opportunity cost of
education, thereby reinforcing the income effect of the
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transfer, given that school attendance and child labour
are substitutes (Skoufias and Parker, 2001).
Skoufias and Parker (2001) offer an economic
model to explain how conditional transfers interact
with families’  preferences and income constraints. This
model shows that the conditions imposed by the
programme will affect time allocation within the family
in different ways, depending on the preferences of the
household and its budgetary situation prior to
programme implementation. In households where the
programme conditions are compulsory (children must
go to school), the programme should have income
substitution and aggregation effects that will enhance
its impact. In households where this is not so, the
programme will only affect cash incomes.
If a child spends more time working and less at
school, the family will be able to consume additional
goods of a monetary value equal to the market wage
paid for the child labour. Conversely, if a child ceases
to give time over to work and instead goes to school,
the family will not be able to consume so many
additional goods. If these budgetary allocations are tied
in with the assumption that utility is maximized, it can
be concluded that there will be a minimum transfer
amount needed to produce incentives >0 to send
children to school. Skoufias and Parker (2001) argue
that conditional transfers in excess of this amount
would be very likely to have a positive effect on
children’s schooling.
As regards the main limitations of conditional
transfers, it has been argued that they ignore the
employment link in the chain of intergenerational
poverty reproduction. ECLAC (2002) and Britto (2005)
have warned that there is no guarantee that greater
educational attainments will be converted into higher
monetary incomes in the long term, since this
relationship is influenced by variables such as the
quality of the education supply, the returns on
education, and unemployment.
It has also been argued that these models do not
incorporate the cultural and psychosocial factors which
could affect the choices and preferences of individuals,
and that they fail to take market imperfections into
account. As ECLAC (2000) points out, demand subsidy
measures may not always work well because: i) parents
do not always act as rational consumers, ii) supply in
the education market is not transparent, and iii)
education cannot be regarded exclusively as a
consumer good.
From a more empirical perspective, increased
school attendance by children may not always imply a
reduction in the incidence and intensity of all forms of
child labour. When an impact assessment was carried
out on the conditional transfer programme of
Bangladesh, for example, it was found that school
attendance had increased at the expense of the children’s
free time (Ravallion and Wodon, 1999). It is also
important to know whether programmes are causing
families to change their attitudes towards education and
child labour, since if they are not then the effects of the
measures may not be sustainable in the long term.
Again, higher demand for education may generate
negative externalities if supply remains constant,
suggesting a need for supply subsidies to compensate.
Some authors have also stressed the importance of
analysing how institutional actors in the school system
are coping with the new demand created by the transfers,
and of establishing whether demand subsidies are
improving the education of the poorest children. There
is also the question of whether an expanded supply of
education might not be more cost-effective than
conditional transfers as a way of improving education
access and increasing human capital in poor families
(Coady and Parker, 2002; Skoufias and Parker, 2001).
As for cash incomes, it has been argued that the
effects of conditional transfers could be limited, owing
to the extreme vulnerability of the families receiving
the benefits (for example, measures might be effective
in narrowing the poverty gap, but not in closing it
entirely), and that cash transfers will not always result
in a better diet for the poorest. The literature shows
calorie-income elasticities ranging between quite high
values (0.54) and very low ones (0.01) (Hoddinot and
Skoufias, 2003); this suggests a need to analyse the
variance that could be produced, over and above the
effect of transfers, by psychosocial and cultural
measures to encourage attitudes conducive to a higher-
quality food intake.
It would also be helpful to analyse the data on the
efficiency and effectiveness of the different approaches
to implementing conditional transfer programmes, i.e.,
the different components incorporated (one-
dimensional or multidimensional measures), the type
of management (centralized or decentralized) and the
targeting mechanisms used. It is also important to
understand how civil society participates in decision-
making and service provision and to examine how
hard-to-reach populations, such as child street workers,
are catered for.
The analysis of the five conditional cash transfer
programmes in the following section brings to bear the
conceptual elements discussed in the preceding
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paragraphs, draws together and systematizes the
available evidence and seeks to provide discussion
1. The national Bolsa Escola programme (Brazil)
This programme of school grants was first
implemented by the state government of Campinhas in
1995. That same year, a new version began to be
applied in the Federal District of Brasilia. The
programme expanded rapidly over the following years,
so that by 2001 there were seven states and over 200
municipalities conducting Bolsa Escola type
programmes (Godoy, 2004). These programmes were
subsequently brought under the Ministry of Education
and in 2003, as part of the new Fome Zero (“Zero
Hunger” ) national anti-poverty strategy, they were
included in the federal Bolsa Familia programme,
which centralized the administration of all conditional
transfer mechanisms.
The Bolsa Escola programme was created to
encourage 6- to 15-year-olds who were enrolled in
some primary or secondary establishment and who
came from families with per capita incomes of no more
than 90 reais a month to stay in primary and secondary
education for longer than they otherwise would have
done. The programme uses transfers to encourage
school attendance and reduce child working (Secretaria
do Programa Nacional de Bolsa Escola, 2002). By
increasing the educational human capital of children,
it is hoped to reduce poverty in the long term (World
Bank, 2001a).
This programme has an educational component
whereby cash transfers are made to poor families with
school-age children. These transfers are conditional on
children attending school for at least 85% of the time
each month (Secretaria do Programa Nacional de Bolsa
Escola, 2002). The amounts transferred do not depend
on the number, age or sex of the children in the
beneficiary families, and vary greatly from one
municipality to another (World Bank, 2001a).
It has been suggested that the programme could
be more efficient and effective if transfer amounts were
tailored to family characteristics (World Bank, 2001a).
For example, the opportunity cost of school attendance
could be higher for adolescents than for younger
children, which would reduce the incentive to send
adolescents to school (Skoufias and Parker, 2001). In
the view of the World Bank (2001a), the transfer
amount should be determined by programme priorities
(mitigation or elimination of poverty).
Selection of Bolsa Escola beneficiaries was
originally carried out by the municipalities. In a given
municipality, the programme would first identify the
poorest areas and then pick out the neediest families
in them, using a scoring system that included different
indicators of family living standards. The programme
did not originally have a national targeting system to
optimize the choice of the poorest geographical areas
and remove administrative inefficiencies (World
Bank, 2001a).
To improve targeting, the Brazilian Government
subsequently created a national register of families that
were beneficiaries of federal programmes. By 2002, the
beneficiary selection process included a number of
stages, with eligible families being identified by a
federal government body on the basis of data collected
by municipalities, after which the final choice of
beneficiaries would be made locally with the
involvement of Social Oversight Councils (Conselhos
de Controle Social), which include representatives of
civil society organizations (Secretaria do Programa
Nacional de Bolsa Escola, 2002).
The evidence suggests that the programme has
been targeted successfully, since leakage rates have
been quite low. Indicators of under-coverage (the target
population not reached by the programme) have been
high, however, and this is put down to the weak
financial capacity of the poorest municipalities (World
Bank, 2001a). It also appears that families with
preschool and adolescent children are being left out.
Two options have been suggested for including these
tools that can contribute to the practical implementation
of programmes of this type.
III
Conditional cash transfer programmes
in Latin America
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groups: the implementation of parallel programmes for
them, or their incorporation into the Bolsa Escola
programme, which would entail an additional nutrition
and health component (World Bank, 2001a).
One of the main obstacles to bringing in hitherto
uncovered populations is financing: since programmes
are financed mainly from local resources, the poorest
municipalities cannot introduce them. Specifically, it has
been suggested that extra resources be provided to the
worst-off municipalities, since reducing transfer amounts
could compromise the effectiveness of the Bolsa Escola
programme (World Bank, 2001a). In recent years,
though, there has been a tendency to increase coverage
by cutting back on transfer amounts (Godoy, 2004).
Objections have also been raised to the school
stay-on limits specified by the programme (between 1
and 2 years), as these mean there is no guarantee that
the benefit will continue. These stay-on thresholds are
set, it is argued, because most legislation for school
grant programmes is not designed “ to get children
through basic education, but to get them off the streets,
and this reinforces the welfarist character of the
programme to the detriment of its redistributive impact”
(Godoy, 2004, p. 22).
Concerning the impact of the Bolsa Escola
programme on human capital accumulation, the
evidence is that the results in terms of school
attendance and narrowing of the grade-for-age gap
have been positive. Some studies have shown that
school attendance is higher and dropout rates lower
among programme beneficiaries than among non-
beneficiaries, and that beneficiary children are more
likely to enter school at the right age than children in
control groups (World Bank, 2001a). It has been
argued that the Bolsa Escola programme has helped
dismantle the mechanisms used by schools to keep out
the poorest students, since in normal circumstances
they tend to exclude the most vulnerable on academic
pretexts (World Bank, 2001a).
One question that has been somewhat neglected
is whether programmes of transfers that are conditional
on investment in educational human capital have any
incidence on learning outcomes. It is also important to
know how schools are responding to the extra demand
created by the programme. To answer these questions,
a quasi-experimental study was carried out, using two
measurements (before entry into the programme and a
year afterwards), on a sample of children from Bolsa
Escola beneficiary families and a control group of
children from families outside the programme (World
Bank, 2001a).
The research showed that teachers and school
heads had a favourable perception of the programme,
which they saw as reinforcing their educational efforts
and providing an opportunity to improve their work
with the poorest children and raise their learning levels.
However, the study did not find any difference in
learning outcomes between programme participants
and children in the control group (World Bank, 2001a).
These data suggest that further efforts are needed to
improve the quality of supply.
Meanwhile, there is no conclusive evidence that
the Bolsa Escola programme reduces child labour
(World Bank, 2001a). Still, if the programme is
assumed to have increased school attendance, it can be
argued that it must have reduced the number of hours
available for children to work. There is a twofold
challenge here: to prevent child labour in out-of-school
hours, and to analyse the potential of different levels
of conditional transfer payments to incentivize the
reduction of child labour.
Meanwhile, cross-sectional studies have shown
that the programme narrows the poverty gap affecting
beneficiary families (World Bank, 2001a), but the
evidence on poverty reduction is not consistent. For
example, according to the World Bank (2001a), the
Bolsa Escola programme is reducing the prevalence of
poverty. Godoy (2004), however, considers that the
school grants have had only a slight poverty reduction
impact, owing to the small amounts transferred and the
vulnerability of beneficiary families.
Godoy (2004) also argues that the Bolsa Escola
programme has not improved families’  own income
generation capabilities. In a survey of beneficiary
families in Campinhas, it was found that barely 1% of
those who left the programme did so because they had
achieved financial independence, and that none of the
families leaving the programme solved their financial
problems. Godoy puts this down to a failure to
coordinate Bolsa Escola interventions with occupational
training and employment initiatives.
2. The Programme for the Eradication of Child
Labour (Brazil)
The Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour
(Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil-PETI)
was created by the Government of Brazil to eradicate
the worst forms of child labour in rural areas. In early
1999, PETI began to expand into urban areas to deal
with the problem of working street children, with a
target population of 266,000 children aged 10 to 14
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working in activities like prostitution, drug dealing,
refuse collection and street selling. A few years ago the
Brazilian Government merged PETI with the Minimum
Income Guarantee Programme (Programa de Garantia
de Renda Minima) to create the Alborada programme,
with a view to improving complementarity, efficiency
and effectiveness.
PETI has similar objectives to the Bolsa Escola
programme, as it aims to increase educational attainment
and reduce poverty, but its main purpose is to eradicate
child labour. To achieve this goal, it makes transfers
to families with school-age children (7 to 14) in rural
and urban areas, on condition of their guaranteeing that
their children will attend school at least 80% of the
time and will participate in the Jornada Ampliada
(“ Extended Day” ) subprogramme of after-school
activities. Transfer amounts are higher in urban areas
than in the countryside, vary from one state to another
and sometimes depend on the number of children per
family. Transfers usually go to the mother.
The programme also has a psychosocial
component whose aim is to alter the beliefs and
attitudes that prevail in many poor families, whose
difficulties lead them to underrate the benefits of
education and set a high value on child labour. PETI also
provides municipalities with funding for the Jornada
Ampliada subprogramme, so that children who attend
school will not find themselves working anyway. The
idea of this supply subsidy is to limit the time available
for children to work.
The targeting process used by PETI involves first
selecting the geographical areas with the highest
incidence of child labour and then collecting
information about households within these. These data
are passed on to a federal agency which carries out
preselection of eligible families. Lastly, the beneficiary
population is selected at the local level, with the
participation of civil society representatives. This
procedure has two advantages: i) it minimizes
exclusion of eligible families and ii) it enables the
programme to be implemented in areas that do not
themselves have sufficient funds for it.
There is some evidence that the programme is
properly targeted in rural areas. For example, it has
been found that beneficiary families tend to be quite
large (up to seven members) and that a third of mothers
never went to school. In a qualitative study carried out
in Pernambuco, most beneficiaries said that they spent
the transfers on essentials like food and clothing
(World Bank, 2001b).
In 1999, PETI began to work towards the
eradication of the worst forms of child labour in urban
areas. This threw up difficulties with programme
design, targeting mechanisms, the setting of transfer
amounts and the selection of transfer components.
Firstly, data on working street children in urban areas
are unreliable or non-existent, which complicates
targeting. Secondly, the heterogeneity of child labour
in cities makes it harder to specify transfer amounts
there than in the countryside. Thirdly, the problems of
street working by children are linked to family neglect,
violence, drugs and health vulnerabilities, so that it is
indispensable for the programme to include
psychosocial and health components.
Hitherto, the psychosocial measures taken by PETI
to deal with child prostitution have been aimed at
prevention and assistance, and have been targeted at
children aged between 7 and 14 from families with per
capita incomes of less than half the minimum wage.
Preventive measures have included mounting a national
campaign to create social awareness of the problem and
holding seminars and workshops. Action to improve
school attendance has included initiatives to give
children better access to institutional support networks
and to promote the relationship between families,
schools and the community. PETI has not taken any steps
to reduce domestic working by children in urban areas.
It has been proposed that PETI should take
advantage of the experience of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), as the PETI model is consistent
with the methodologies used by these (World Bank,
2001b). In particular, it has been suggested that the
programme should act to enhance children’ s self-
esteem and social skills and should implement
educational measures in the fields of health and human
rights. One alternative to including new components
in PETI could be to make transfers conditional on
children participating in NGO-run prevention and
assistance programmes. PETI would thus avoid the costs
of adding a new component and would benefit from
the experience of these organizations.
Concerning the effects of PETI, data are only
available on the rural programme. Impact assessment
was carried out by means of a survey taking in three
municipalities that were participating in the programme
and three that were not (World Bank, 2001b). This
survey gathered information about the effects of the
programme on the number of school hours, years of
education completed, grade-for-age, child labour and
children’s involvement in high-risk work.
The assessment showed that PETI had doubled the
number of hours spent in school and cut child working
significantly. According to Sedlacek, Yap and Orazem
(2002), it was the Jornada Ampliada programme that
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accounted for the reduction in child labour force
participation. These authors argue, however, that PETI
was less successful in cutting the hours worked by
children. In the states of Bahia and Sergipe there was
a “spillover effect” , so that children not included in the
programme became more likely to work.
Studies have also been carried out to gauge the
effects of the psychosocial component of PETI on adults’
attitudes towards children’s education and child labour.
Broadly, only a minority of adult beneficiaries believe
that children need to go to school (18% in Bahia and
11% in Pernambuco), and more than half do not think
that child labour is bad for children’ s development.
These figures are borne out by events in some
municipalities that have fallen behind with transfer
payments: when this has happened, some beneficiaries
have threatened to take their children out of school,
revealing how hard it is to change beliefs about
education and child labour (World Bank, 2001b).
As for the effects on the status of women, some
studies have shown that the programme policy of
paying transfers to the mother has given women greater
responsibility and independence and a greater say in
the family. Most of the women surveyed said that their
lives had changed once they started to receive the
transfers, as they were able to spend more time
working while their children were at school (World
Bank, 2001b).
3. The Families in Action programme (Colombia)
The Families in Action (Familias en Acción)
programme was implemented as part of the Social
Support Network (Red de Apoyo Social-RAS), a
temporary social safety net created in 1999 by the
Colombian Government to cushion the effects of
economic recession and fiscal policy adjustments on
the welfare of the most vulnerable populations. Two
other social programmes, Youth in Action (Jóvenes en
Acción) and Jobs in Action (Empleo en Acción), were
implemented along with Families in Action.
Families in Action is a conditional cash transfer
mechanism whose original purpose was to reduce the
impact of recession on poor households. The specific
goal of the programme is to safeguard and promote
human capital formation in children aged 0 to 17 from
poor households by supporting and encouraging
investment by poor families in health, nutrition and
education.
Like the Bolsa Escola programme and PETI,
Families in Action provides assistance through an
education component, but combines this with health
and nutrition services. The education component
provides a transfer equivalent to the direct cost to the
poorest families of keeping their 7- to 18-year-old
children at school. This amount was US$ 6 a month
per capita in primary schools and US$ 12 in secondary
schools (Rawlings, 2002). The amount of the transfer
is not determined by the opportunity cost of child
labour, either because the programme does not have
explicit goals of this type or because it was set up to
help families cope with the crisis.
The second component, health and nutrition,
transfers resources to poor families with children aged
0 to 6. The cash assistance is given to the mother to
ensure it will be invested in the child, and to give
women more independence.
As for the conditions laid down by the
programme, with the health and nutrition component
families retain the benefits for as long as they keep
taking their children to primary health services for the
appropriate check-ups and immunizations. With the
education component, transfers are suspended if
children miss school without good reason more than
20% of the time and/or repeat more than one school
year.
Where targeting mechanisms are concerned,
Families in Action operates in rural and urban areas
not covered by the Jobs in Action (Empleo en Acción)
programme. These areas have to meet basic eligibility
criteria, such as the presence of a bank and an adequate
supply of education and health services. Within the
geographical areas that meet the eligibility conditions,
the programme selects families classified as SISBEN 1
(the most vulnerable). No health or nutritional support
is given to SISBEN 1 families that have children aged 0
to 6 in Community Welfare Homes (Hogares
Comunitarios de Bienestar).
Families in Action has performed well in terms
of keeping inclusion errors to a minimum, as 71% of
families entering the programme were indigent at the
time (Attanasio, Meghir and others, 2004). However,
it has had difficulty covering isolated rural areas that
lack social and financial services, and this means a high
probability of exclusion error.
The programme has an impact assessment system
that began to be applied in 2002. In that year information
began to be collected on three population groups: i)
families that had been in the programme for three
months; ii) families that were going to start in the
programme and iii) families for which no action was
planned. The assessment design provides for repeated
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follow-up measurements in the three groups selected
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2003).
The first assessment reports show the programme
having favourable effects in the areas of education,
health and nutrition. It has been positive for school
attendance among rural and urban children aged 12 to
17, but not among those aged 8 to 11. According to
Attanasio, Battistin and others (2005), this is because
the younger children had very high school attendance
rates before entering the programme.
As for health, Families in Action significantly
increased the percentage of children aged under 48
months whose check-ups were up to date and reduced
the proportion of rural children with diarrhoea. In its
nutrition component, the programme increased food
consumption considerably, mainly in rural areas. Most
of the increase was due to a more varied diet, especially
where protein-rich foods were concerned (Attanasio,
Battistin and others, 2005).
4. The Social Protection Network (Nicaragua)
The Social Protection Network (Red de Protección
Social-RPS) promotes the development of human capital
in the form of education, nutrition and health in
extremely poor rural families. The design of the RPS
provides for a two-stage pilot phase. In the first stage,
the programme has benefited 6,000 families in 21
census areas, selected by means of geographical and
household targeting criteria. In the second stage, the
RPS will benefit 4,000 families.
The programme has two components: i) health/
food security and ii) education. It operates through cash
transfers and other measures designed to stimulate
demand for and improve the supply of education and
health services. Transfers in the health/food security
component are intended to ensure that poor families
with children under 5 can buy food; this benefit is
conditional upon mothers attending health workshops
and children being taken in for medical check-ups.
The workshops for mothers teach basic nutrition
and reproductive health skills. The medical check-ups
are to monitor children’s growth, carry out vaccination
and provide them with vitamins and antiparasitic drugs.
Monthly check-ups in the home are also carried out for
children under 2. In addition, training is given to health-
care providers in non-governmental organizations to
ensure that the beneficiary communities receive high-
quality medical services.
In its education component, the programme makes
cash payments to poor families with children aged from
7 to 13 on condition that the children enrol in school
and have an 85% attendance rate. This benefit consists
of a fixed sum per household that does not vary by the
number of children in the family. Cash is also provided
for the purchase of items needed for school (clothes,
equipment), and here the amount is determined by the
number of children in the family.
The education component also includes a supply
subsidy, in the form of a small payment to teachers.
Parents’  organizations sometimes request financial
assistance to support the work of teachers. This
financial assistance is often provided to the families,
which then pass on the appropriate amounts to the
teachers. The latter may use this money to buy school
items and keep back some of it for later use.
Food payments amount to 13% of beneficiary
families’  total yearly spending before they entered the
programme, and cash support for education represents
8% of annual family spending. Total payments are
equivalent to a nominal increase of 21% in families’
consumption, a figure comparable to the assistance
provided by the Oportunidades programme in Mexico
and the Family Allowance Programme (Programa de
Asignación Familiar-PRAF) in Honduras. By contrast
with these two programmes, however, RPS transfers
are not index-linked, so that the real value of payments
has declined by about 7% (IFPRI, 2002).
Implementation of the RPS entailed coordination
efforts at the national, regional and local levels.
Locally, planning was carried out by committees
involving ministry officials, civil society representatives
and RPS staff. This collaboration was important in
equipping the supply side to deal with rising demand
for health and education services.
In the pilot phase, RPS payments have usually gone
to mothers, since family food security and children’s
quality of life are better when resources are managed
by women (IFPRI, 2002). Extra payments have
sometimes been made to families meeting all the
education and health targets and requirements.
An impact assessment with a quasi-experimental
design, involving intervention and control groups,
baseline measurements and follow-up, was carried out
during the pilot phase of the RPS. The study was used
to estimate the main effects of the programme on
incomes, diet, nutrition and education (IFPRI, 2002).
The RPS had a 20% impact on per capita spending
in beneficiary households, mainly because incomes in
the control group shrank. In fact, the data do not show
any increase in incomes in the beneficiary group, but
do show a significant drop in the incomes of families
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outside the programme, something that can be
attributed to the economic crisis affecting the areas
where the RPS was implemented. This indicates that the
programme has had the effect of cushioning the
adverse consequences of a recession. Again, the
percentage of income spent on food by families in the
intervention group remained high (70% of total
spending), which means that transfers have not had
substantial effects on the poverty indicators.
It was also found that programme participation
encouraged consumption of a more varied diet, in terms
of both quantity and quality. For example, families in
the intervention group buy four food types more than
the control group and tend to spend more money on
more nutritional foods. At the same time, there is no
evidence that the programme has led to investment in
home improvements or durable goods, or that payments
have given adults a disincentive to work.
In the area of health, the programme can be seen
to have had positive effects on access to primary care
services. The number of children undergoing check-ups
increased, as did the number being given ferrous
sulphate. Both the RPS group and the control group saw
major increases in vaccination levels, suggesting there
was a spillover effect in the distribution of vaccines to
the areas where the control group lived and the clinics
used by it.
Lastly, the RPS had a significant impact on school
enrolment. These effects were most substantial in the
7- to 9-year-old group and least so among 12- to 13-
year-olds. Overall, the effects were three times as great
for extremely poor families, and twice as great for poor
families, as for non-poor families. The difference in
school stay-on rates was smaller, although it was still
favourable to the RPS (8%). Distance to school (school
attendance cost) was found to be a major factor in stay-
on rates, which highlights the need to improve access
to supply.
5. The Oportunidades programme (formerly
PROGRESA) (Mexico)
PROGRESA was created by the Mexican Federal
Government in 1997 as a strategy to support rural
families in extreme poverty. In 2001, during the
administration of President Fox, its name was changed
to the Oportunidades (“Opportunities” ) programme and
its services were extended to urban populations. The
Oportunidades programme is one of the most
thoroughly analysed and assessed conditional cash
transfer programmes in Latin America, and its design
marks a significant shift in social services provision in
Mexico. This shift is expressed in the following
principles guiding the work of the programme: i)
targeting, ii) intersectorality, iii) the empowerment of
women and iv) shared responsibility (Skoufias and
Parker, 2001).
The purpose of the Oportunidades programme is
to increase the capabilities of families that live in
extreme poverty by investing in human capital. The
programme has three components: education, health
and nutrition. With the education component, payments
are made to families with children under 18 enrolled
in a school between the first year of primary education
and the third year of secondary education. To create
incentives for families to invest in human capital, the
payments are conditional on the children attending
school. If a child has a non-attendance rate of over 15%
in a month without good reason, the family does not
receive the assistance. The programme provides
additional resources to schools in communities where
it operates, to compensate for the negative externalities
that could be generated by the increase in demand.
Transfer amounts are set on the basis of the
additional income the children would have brought in
for their families had they been working. The cash
payments rise with a child’s age, and at the secondary
level they are higher for girls. They are adjusted for
inflation every six months, which prevents their real
value from falling.
The health component of the Oportunidades
programme involves the provision of primary care to
all members of the family. These medical services are
provided at clinics operated by the Secretariat of Health
and the Mexican Social Security Institute (Instituto
Mexicano del Seguro Social). The nutrition component
provides for a set cash payment to improve food
consumption, and the provision of food supplements
for children aged from 4 months to 2 years, unweaned
babies and breastfeeding mothers. These supplements
are also given to children aged 2 to 5 who are at risk
of malnutrition or are poorly nourished. To continue
qualifying for the benefits, families have to visit health
clinics regularly.
Cash benefits are paid to the mother. It has been
calculated that cash transfers represent an average of
22% of participating families’  monthly income. After
three years in the programme, families can apply for
their entitlement to be renewed.
The targeting procedure used by the
Oportunidades programme involves geographical
selection using an index of deprivation constructed
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from census data. A census is conducted in the
communities selected, covering all households, to
identify eligible families. For the final selection of
beneficiary families, assemblies are held to involve the
community.
It has been claimed that the beneficiary selection
approach of the Oportunidades programme is efficient
when it comes to identifying extremely poor localities
and households, but less effective at distinguishing
between “ localities or households in the middle of the
scale” . For this reason, programmes of this type “may
be quite successful at reducing the poverty gap or the
severity of poverty, but may have a negligible impact
on the headcount ratio”  (Skoufias, Davis and De la
Vega, 1999, p. 18).
It has also been argued that “ the non economic
costs associated with targeting deserve serious
consideration in the overall decision to pursue a
household level targeting strategy… Preliminary
qualitative surveys from PROGRESA’s evaluation show
that these costs of targeting in rural, often indigenous,
communities may not be negligible”  (Skoufias, Davis
and De la Vega, 1999, pp. 18-19). González de la
Rocha (2003) has emphasized the importance of
considering the effects of the targeting mechanisms
used on the social capital of beneficiary communities
and families.
González de la Rocha (2003) argues that mistakes
in selecting families are one of the main difficulties
faced by the Oportunidades programme, because of the
discontent they cause among poor families that have
not been chosen. This could give rise to “ social
divisions within communities when people’ s
perception of their own and other families’
circumstances do not match the technical programme
identifiers”  (González de la Rocha, 2003, p. 12).
Nonetheless, there are also “ relationships of mutual aid
and support, despite the breach between beneficiary
and non-beneficiary households”  (González de la
Rocha, 2003, p. 18).
Difficulties have also been detected in the use of
community assemblies to select families. In many
communities these assemblies have not worked as they
should, because participants do not dare express their
views openly (González de la Rocha, 2003).
One of the distinctive aspects of the Oportunidades
programme has been its impact assessment system.
This has allowed for comparative testing of basic
hypotheses for the design of conditional transfer
programmes, e.g., their cost-effectiveness as compared
to other methods of enhancing educational human
capital (such as supply subsidies), their incidence on
the way children’s time is shared out between school,
work and leisure, and their effects on the nutritional
situation of minors. The quantitative and qualitative
methods included in this assessment system have
enabled researchers to ascertain the effects of the
programme and identify problems and unforeseen
situations.
The design of the Oportunidades programme
assessment included the random allocation of 506
eligible communities in seven states to intervention and
control groups. A census of the 24,077 households in
the control and intervention localities was conducted
before the programme began, and the data gathered was
used as the baseline. Follow-up surveys then began to
be conducted every six months.
Skoufias and Parker (2001) found that the
programme had had positive effects in increasing
school enrolment and reducing child working, and this
was particularly true among adolescents. They also
noted, however, that the reduction in children’ s
participation in working activities did not match the
educational benefits obtained. In the case of girls, most
of the success of the Oportunidades programme was
with adolescents who combined school with domestic
work, which could indicate a loss of leisure time.
The qualitative study carried out by González de
la Rocha and Escobar (2002) observed that some
families were unwilling for their children to stay on at
school —an attitude that differed sharply by gender.
The authors state that “ there were numerous cases in
which parents seemed to be trying to use their
daughters’  labour to reduce their own domestic burden”
(González de la Rocha and Escobar, 2002, p. 27). Poor
families’  perceptions of child labour were also found
to be a major obstacle. Some beneficiaries of the
Oportunidades programme tended to think that child
labour: i) helps children to make the transition to adult
life; ii) prevents drug addiction, gang involvement and
alcohol abuse, and iii) represents a saving for the
family.
At the same time, participation in the programme
has given rise to some conflicts within families. There
have been separations and desertions by men, some of
whom have also curtailed their contribution to the
household economy. In many cases, however, women
have presented a united front to counteract the effects
of male reactions to their loss of power (González de
la Rocha and Escobar, 2002).
Another issue is the cost-effectiveness of subsidies
that are conditional on demand, as compared to an
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increase in supply (improvement in the quality of
education services and/or the building of more
schools). After analysing the Oportunidades
programme data, Coady and Parker (2002) concluded
that demand-oriented measures had a cost-effectiveness
of 9,730 Mexican pesos for each extra year of
education generated, whereas expanding supply had a
cost-effectiveness of 113,500 Mexican pesos for each
extra year of school.
Lastly, Hoddinot and Skoufias (2003) analysed
the effects on calorie intake of participation in a
subcomponent of the Oportunidades programme:
educational talks on nutrition. The authors stated that,
while programme beneficiaries increased their intake
of high-calorie foods, this change was attributable to
the higher incomes resulting from the transfers.
However, the talks were effective in encouraging
participants to diversify their diets and consume
calories from animal, fruit and vegetable products.
These data illustrate how important psychosocial and




Conditional transfer programmes aim to build up the
human capital of children and young people in order
to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty, and
they do so by creating incentives for families to invest
in human capital from education, nutrition and health.
These programmes stem from an approach that
prioritizes action to deal with the causes of poverty and
thus defeat it in the long term, unlike traditional welfare
programmes that centre on redistribution and short-
term poverty reduction.
These transfer programmes cater primarily to
populations in a situation of structural poverty, by
delivering assistance and promoting human capital with
a view to reducing future risks. For the most part, they
were not designed to provide safety nets when
economic shocks occurred (Hicks and Wodon, 2001).
Nonetheless, some initiatives do explicitly set out to
mitigate the consequences of economic crises for the
poorest (Families in Action) and others have cushioned
the effects of a recession (the RPS in Nicaragua), which
indicates that conditional transfers can play this role
(Sedlacek, Hahi and Gustafsson-Wright, 2000;
Rawlings, 2004). Still, other instruments, such as
temporary employment programmes, seem more
appropriate for dealing with the worst effects of crises
(Morley and Coady, 2003).
The evidence shows that conditional transfer
programmes are effective at increasing school
enrolment and attendance in the short term. Their
effectiveness in reducing child working is not so clear,
however. The Oportunidades programme and PETI have
succeeded in reducing children’ s participation in
working activities, but in the case of the Bolsa Escola
programme the evidence is inconclusive. The difference
could be due to the Extended Day component specific
to PETI and to the method used by the Oportunidades
programme to set the transfer amount.
According to Skoufias and Parker (2001), the data
on the Oportunidades programme reveal an inverse
relationship between child labour and school
attendance, indicating that these two activities are
substitutes for each other. The information on Bolsa
Escola and the Oportunidades programme, however,
indicates that there is a need to follow up the
distribution of time between school, paid and unpaid
work and leisure time, so that educational goals are not
attained at the expense of children’s free time, or do
not have to compete with domestic work.
One aspect that is crucial to the design of
conditional transfer programmes for education is the
cash payment amount decided upon. As we have seen,
methods differ considerably from one programme to
another. Perhaps the best way of settling on a sum that
will encourage school attendance and discourage child
working is to calculate it from the opportunity cost of
sending children to school. If the view is taken that this
cost might rise with the child’s age and that it might
be higher for girls, the reasonable course would be to
set higher payment amounts for adolescents and girls,
as the Opportunities programme does.
In setting payment amounts, consideration should
also be given to education costs, i.e., all the expenses
involved in sending a child to school. This is the
method used by Families in Action. Education
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payments should be calculated from the number of
children in the family, to avoid the possible loss of
incentives in larger households, and should be index-
linked so that their real value does not erode.
Another aspect to consider are beneficiaries’
perceptions of child labour and education. Studies
carried out by PETI and the Oportunidades programme
found that families set a limited value on education and
did not believe child work to be detrimental to their
children’ s future. This reveals the importance of
psychosocial measures to change these perceptions.
Otherwise, children may be very likely to leave school
and resume work once programmes have ended, which
would jeopardize the sustainability of the changes.
Making women the preferential recipients of
payments seems to be a good approach: the evidence
shows that women administer financial assistance more
efficiently than men (IFPRI, 2002). This also nurtures
feelings of autonomy and independence, which are
indicators of empowerment (Zimmerman, 1990 and
1995). Nonetheless, steps must be taken to avoid both
the adverse consequences that might be caused by male
reactions to women’s new autonomy and the conflicts
that may arise as girls participate less in domestic work.
A good practice is to implement a supply
component to compensate for the greater pressure that
increased demand places on the school system. The
information available indicates that demand subsidies
are well received by schools, but that learning
outcomes are not improved by children’s participation
in programmes. This suggests a need for education
quality improvement measures that do more than just
compensate for higher demand.
There is evidence that conditional transfers to
support demand raise the educational standards of
children from poor families more effectively and
efficiently than the expansion of supply. While these
data provide decision-making input, though, the results
of other research will have to be awaited. The
information yielded by the assessment system of the
Family Allowance Programme in Honduras will help
to clarify the matter (Alvarez, 2001).
Some conditional transfer programmes have
narrowed the poverty gap affecting poor households,
and others have cushioned the consequences of an
economic crisis. Their potential for raising beneficiaries
above the poverty line is unclear, however, although
it may transpire that the likelihood of this happening
depends on transfer amounts, programme targeting and
an absence of economic contractions.
In the long term, poverty will only be defeated if
households’  income generating capacity is increased.
Although simulations indicate that the extra years of
schooling will yield earnings gains of 8% for children
in the Oportunidades programme and 9% for children
in the RPS in Nicaragua (Morley and Coady, 2003;
Skoufias and McClafferty, 2001), this cannot be
automatic, given the incidence of other factors such as
the quality of learning and unemployment rates. This
being so, there is a vital need to improve both education
quality and links with employment programmes.
Where health and nutrition are concerned,
Families in Action has had positive effects on access
to and use of services in the primary health-care
network. The evidence for the Oportunidades
programme indicates that this has had positive effects
on diet and that the inclusion of psychoeducational
components has led to families diversifying and
improving the quality of what they eat.
The programmes differ in their components,
administration methods and targeting mechanisms,
although less so now than when they started. In recent
years there has been a tendency to consolidate
programmes involving multiple components (education,
health and diet) with centralized national administration
and targeting mechanisms at different stages, in line
with the Oportunidades programme model.
The literature on the subject presents programmes
of this type as more comprehensive (since they deal
simultaneously with the different dimensions of human
capital), more efficient in their planning and
management and more effective in their targeting. Also,
their measures embrace the whole family, creating the
potential for synergies and a greater impact.
The inclusion/exclusion of poor families within
communities is an issue that will have to be examined
in the light of the social and community costs that it
could give rise to. It is important to consider the lessons
from the Oportunidades programme regarding the
dissatisfaction felt by families that were not selected
for it, a situation that could create conflicts within the
community and erode its social capital (González de
la Rocha, 2003). To lessen the non-economic costs of
targeting, it will be necessary to improve community
participation arrangements, such as the community
assemblies of the Oportunidades programme or the
Social Oversight Councils (Conselhos de Controle
Social) of the Bolsa Escola programme.
Civil society organizations have involved
themselves to some extent with service provision,
planning and the selection of beneficiaries, as the
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experience of the Bolsa Escola Social Oversight
Councils illustrates. One option is to subcontract the
services of non-governmental organizations that have
a track record in working with difficult groups, such
as street children. One of the conditions attached to
transfers could be that beneficiaries attend programmes
offered by these NGOs, something that could maximize
the efficiency of programme measures by making it
cheaper to expand supply and capitalizing on the
experience of these institutions.
Lastly, what really sets these conditional transfer
programmes apart from other measures implemented
in Latin America is the use of impact assessment
systems as part of the programme design. Some
assessments have included the random allocation of
communities to experimental and control groups,
together with repeated measurements. Assessment
systems have been used to ascertain the effects of
programme measures and have made it easier to
compare the hypotheses on which programmes of this
kind are based. Particularly applicable are the
experiences of the Oportunidades programme
(Mexico), the Social Protection Network (Nicaragua)
and the Families in Action programme (Colombia).
The design of the Family Allowance Programme
(Honduras) assessment system also repays study.
(Original: Spanish)
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